Market Failure in Small Group Health Insurance by David Cutler
NBER WORKING PAPER SERIES
MARKET FAILURE IN SMALL
GROUP HEALTh INSURANCE
David M. Cutler
Working Paper No. 4879




I jm rateful to Len Berman, Peter Diamond, Roger Gordon, Jon Gruber, Jeff Mackie-Mason,
Brigitte Madrian, Jim Mays, Mark McClellan, Jonathan Morduch, Joe Newhouse, Doug Staiger,
and Richard Zeckhauser for helpful comments, and to the National Institute on Agingfor
financial support. This paper is part of NBER's research program in Health Care. Any opinions
expressed are those of the author and not those of the National Bureau of EconomicResearch.
© 1994 by David NI. Cutler. All rights reserved. Short sections of text, not to exceed two
paragraphs, may be quoted without explicit permission provided that full credit,including ©
notice, is given to the source.NBER Working Paper #4879
October 1994
MARKET FAILURE IN SMALL
GROUP HEALTH INSURANCE
ABSTRACT
Typically, health insurance premiums depend at least in part on the previouscosts of the
insuring lu-rn, a factor termed "experience rating". This link between health status and future
premiums raises concerns of market failure, since it limits the ability of firms to insure the price
at which they can purchase insurance in future years. This paper examines the economic factors
influencing experience rating. The first part of the paper demonstrates that experience rating is
quantitatively important. Premiums at the 90th percentile of the distribution are 2 1/2 times
greater than premiums at the 10th percentile of the distribution, and this difference does not
appear to be due to the generosity of benefits or the demographic composition of the firm. The
second part of the paper then discusses explanations for the prevalence of community rating,
including inability to write long-term contracts, lack of demand from firms with below average
costs, and public policies that provide subsidies to the uninsured. The last part of the paper
examines these predictions empirically. I find evidence that firms with high-wage employees and
low turnover have less premium variability than firms with low-wage employees or high turnover,





and NBERConcerns about the efficiency of health insurance markets have risento the top of the political
agenda.President Clinton hilled his health care proposalas"health care that's always there"—including
significantreformofthe smallgroupinsurance market.Aspectsof small group insurance market reform
are supported by both Democrats andRepublicans,as well as by trade groups such as the Health
InsuranceAssociationof America(Hall,1992).
Theconcernover smallgroup insurancemarketsisdriven by several perceivedmarket failures
(Cutler, 1994). Oneissue is the low rate of insurancecoverageinsmallfirms. Only aboutone-thirdof
firms with fewerthan50employees offerhealth insurance, afact that hasbeen variouslyattributed to
insurancepractices such as redlining and pre-existingconditions exclusions(Zellers, McLaughlin,and
Frick,1992), or to the high cost of insurance in general (Morrisey, Jensen, and Morlock, 1993;
Leihowitzand Chernew, 1992).
Equally important, however, isthepricing ofinsurancefor firms that choose to offerit.
insurancepremiums are typically based at least in part on the expectedmedicalcostsof the firm
purchasing insurance, a method termed 'experience rating". Thus, firmsthatexperienceadverse events -
- even forrandomfactors -- willpay more for insurancethan firms that do not.This problemis
particularlyacute for smallfirms, where the numberof employees is not large enoughtodiversify
internally. For these firms, one or two cases of illness can result in substantial premium increases.
The prevalence of experience rating raises immediate questionsabout market failure.
Presumably, individuals would like to insure that iftheybecome sick,theirpremiumswillnot increase,
just as they like tobeinsured for costsina givenyear. When individuals cannot purchase this insurance,
or itis notprovided through community rated policies,theremay be largeefficiency losses.
These pricingissueshavenotescapedpublic attention.Thirty-nine percent of Americans report
beingafraid that 'ifIhave large medical bills, my health plan will refuse toinsure me" (LouisHarrisand Associates, 1992). and over 70 percent believe that insurance premiums should be the same for sick
and healthy people (Blendon, Edwards, and Szalay, 1991).
This paper considers the economic determinants of experience rating health insurance. The first
part of the paper documents the wide variation in insurance premiums in the current market. In 1991,
a policy at the 90th percentile of the premium distribution cost 2 1/2 times as much as a policy at the 10th
percentile of the distribution. For small firms, the differential is even greater. Very little of this
variation is due to differences in the generosity of the benefits or to demographic factors such as the age
of the employees, however. Much more appears to be due to random risk factors.
The second part of the paper examines why community rating is not more prevalent. I consider
four explanations. The first is adverse selection or moral hazard. Community rated policies may attract
those expecting to he sick in the future, or may encourage riskier behavior on the part of those insured.
Adverse selection and moral hazard are unlikely to be important, however, because information about
health risks is generally available, arid because insurers can index their premiums to average cost growth.
The second explanation is incomplete contracting. If neither firms nor insurers can commit to
multi-year insurance policies, there is no incentive for firms that are healthy to pool with firms that are
sick. Thus, premiums will be based on expected costs.
The third explanation is that firms have differing demands for community rated insurance. Even
if insurers are willing to commit to long-term policies, firms with healthier employees may not be willing
to do so. For a firm with healthy employees, committing to community rating is similar to other
insurance purchases: by paying more this year, the firm locks in average rates in the future. Any firm-
specific characteristics that influence the demand for insurance in general — such as income, age, or
turnover -- may also influence the decision to enroll in community pools.
The fourth explanation is that public policy induces firms to choose experience rated policies.
Many public sector programs, such as public hospitals and Medicaid, subsidize health care for the
2uninsured. Individuals who know these programs are available may decide to choose more experience
rated policies. In periods where they are healthy, they will pay a low premium, and if they become sick,
they can drop coverage and use public care.
The third part of the paper examines empirically these explanations for experience rating. I find
evidence that firm-specific factors are associated with the amount of experience rating. Firms with higher
wage employees or lower turnover have much less premium variability than firms with lower wage
employees or higher turnover. A one standard deviation change in the share of high wage employees in
a firm or in the turnover rate leads to changes in the variability of premiums of between 15 and 20
percent. There is no evidence, however, that the extent of public sector provision influences the amount
of experience rating. The evidence thus suggests that firm-based models of the demand for community
rating are most important in explaining the observed market behavior.
The paper proceeds as follows. The first section defines community and experience rating. The
second section examines the amount of premium variability empirically. The third section discusses the
expected amount of community rating and experience rating. The next two sections present the
econometric framework and the empirical results. The last section concludes.
I. What is Experience Rating?
There are two types of health risks that individuals might want to insure.' The first is that costs
during a year will exceed their expected value at the beginning of the year (intratemporal risk). Most
Americans (about 85 percent) have insurance against this risk; in exchange for an annual premium, they
receive limits on their out-of-pocket spending. The second risk is that an individual will learn they are
'I am grateful to Jonathan Morduch for suggesting this categorization of the risks.
3permanently less hcalthy than theyhad thought, and thus that premiums in the future will be higher than
theyhad expected (intertemporal risk). Insuring against tb's latter risk is more complicated than the first
one, since it relies on individuals being able to obtain insurance in future years at a price contracted in
advance.
To make this concrete, consider an individual with medical costs in year t given by:
C, = Z,fl1 + X,, + w, , (1)
where Z is a set of factors about the insurance policy the individual is covered by (such as the deductible
and covered services), X is a set of demographic factors that determines health expenditures (such as age,
gender, race and location), andis an individual-specific random factor with mean zero.
Many illnesses have lasting effects on health spending. Having a heart attack today, for example,
signals greater risk of a heart attack in the future. Babies born with birth defects often require medical
care throughout their life. Thus., it is natural to assume thatwill be positively serially correlated over
time: cJ,.,+1L, p>O.
Individuals who require above-average care in one year will enter the following year with "pre-
existing conditions', on average, of p w,,.If both insurers and individuals can observe prior year
spending, this information could he incorporated into premiums.2 Consider premiums of the form:
Prem,
= + X,$2 + Op,,. (2)
If 0>0, then individuals bear at least some intertemporal risk. If p and 0 are small, these costs
will not be large relative to lifetime income. If p and 0 are large, however, unexpected health shocks
today may have a significant effect relative to lifetime income. An important dimension of insurance
2Since the X's and Z's are deterministic, community rating these factors is essentially a distributional
question rather than an efficiency issue. Potentially, some demographic factors such as race or gender
may be viewed as random at the time of birth, which individuals behind the "veil of ignorance" might
want to pool. I focus on the more concrete case of risks that become known after a person is alive.
4policies is thus the degree of intertemporal pooling, 0. Therearetwo polar cases. The first is
community rating", where everyone pays the same price (regardless of health risks) and premiums are
not updated to retlect changes in health status (0=0). The second is "experience rating", where
individuals bear the full burden of changes in health status (0= 1).' To the extent that individuals want
community rated policies but cannot purchase them, experience rating may be a welfare loss. There is,
in essence, a missing market -" the market to insure changes in underlying health status.
To illustrate the potential magnitude of this issue, I estimated a linear regression for health
spending (in $1991) among full-year insured individuals, using as explanatory variables a quadratic in
age, dummy variables for males and non-whites, family income, and region andcentral city dummy
variables. The standard deviation of the residual from this regression (an estimate of a,) is $5,850. If
cost differences of this magnitude are forecastable at the beginning of the year, they imply large premium
differences for otherwise similar individuals.
Of course, most health insurance in the United States is purchased by firms rather than
individuals.4 For a firm, random risks can be averaged over the entire set of employees rather than over
just one person. The variance of medical costs per employee will therefore be smaller: c2,.=cr2,/N,
where N is total employment. Thus, for large firms, experience rating is relatively unimportant. For
small firms, however, the variance of the random factors may be large. In a firm of 10 people, for
example, the standard deviation of residual costs would still be $1,850, and even at 50 employees,the
standard deviation of residual costs would be $827. Thus, the potential for experience rating to have
large welfare costs is possible.
The economic questions are how important premium variability is, and why do we observe so
much of it.I turn to these questions in the next sections.
3Experience rating is common in other insurance markets as well, such as automobile insurance.
41n 1992, almost 90 percent of people with private coverage had employment-based coverage.
5II. Evidence on TheVariabilityof Premiums
Toexamine empirical evidence on thevariability of insurance premiums, I use premium data
fr rn the HealthInsurance Association ofAmerica(HIAA). Each year, the HIAA surveys roughly3,000
firms, askingwhether they offer health insurance,thetype of policies offered (Conventional, Health
MjintenanceOrganization[HMOI,PreferredProvider Organization tPPO],or Point of Service IPOSJ),
andthe premiums paid. There are also some questions about firm characteristics.I ue data from the
1991survey, sincethere aremore questions asked about firm attributesinthat year.6 The 1991 survey
includes3,323 firms,ofwhom 1,854 offered insurance.
Tocompare premiumsacrossfirms, Iusethe costofanindividualpolicy.7 Most (77percent)
smallfirms offer only one policy --typicallyaconventional plan.I thus use thatpremium in the
analysis. For firms offering multiple policies, I use the premium for the conventional policy first, or
absent that,forthe PPO.9Iexclude firms (344 in total) with only HMOs or POS plans, for reasons
discussed below.
An important difficulty with the premium data is that many firms self insure rather than purchase
insurance. In principle, firms that self insure are supposed to report their "premium equivalent" --an
Health Maintenance Organizations combine the insurance and delivery functions for medical care.
Traditional HMOs hire physicians directly and operate their own hospitals. Many HMOS will not
reimburse subscribers if they go outside the HMO for care. A Preferred Provider Organization is a
looser collection of private physicians and hospitals that agree to accept lower reimbursement and some
utilization monitoring in exchange for being listed in a network. Subscribers enrolled in a FF0 pay less
when they use a network provider, thus encouraging receipt of care in the network. A Point of Service
plan is an HMO that allows subscribers to be partially reimbursed for care received outside the HMO.
6For a more general description of the data, see Sullivan, Miller, Feldman, and Dowd (1992).
1Generally, a family policy costs roughly 2.5 times an individual policy. I exclude firms that report
a composite single/family premium, since this will typically be greater than a single premium alone.
The results reported below are insensitive to including a dummy variable for whether the firm
offered one or more than one policy.
6estimate of average spending used to determine how much an employee would pay for continuation
coverage after leaving the firm. In practice, premium equivalents are not reported for many (247 in total)
self-insured firms. Since the probability of self-insurance rises with firm size, the sample size is thinner
at larger tirms. I return to this issue below. The final number of observations is therefore 1,463.
The administrative costs of insurance vary dramatically by firm size.For small firms,
administrative loads range up to 40 percent of claims paid; for larger firms, they average about 6 percent
of claims paid. This variability in administrative costs makes comparisons of unadjusted ptemiums across
firms difficult. To correct for this, I form a measure of the "benefit cost" (denoted B) of each policy --
the premium deflated by the average administrative load for firms of that size.
The upper panel of Table 1 shows the distribution of benefit costs.'° As the Table indicates,
there is an enormous dispersion of costs. A policy at the 10th percentile of the distribution costs $831,
while a policy at the 90th percentile costs $2,126, or 2 1/2 times as much. In an alternative metric, the
variability of log costs is 17 percent. so that the spread of costs encompassing two-thirds of the
distribution is about 80 percent.
The benefit cost differential is even larger for small firms. Among firms with 50 or fewer
employees, the 90/10 differential is 174 percent. The differential falls to 120 percent for firms of 51
to 100 employees, and 7! percent for firms of 50! to 1000 employees, before increasing with the largest
firms. This last finding may be related to the limited sampling of large firms. In the empirical analysis
below, I restrict attention to firms with 1,000 or fewer employees.
9The percentage ot firms that self-insure and do not have a premium equivalent, by firm size, is: ￿ 50
employees - 7%; 51-tOO - 6%; 101-500 - 19%; 501-1000 - 30%; >1000-45%.
These estimates are similar to those in Cutler (1994). En that paper, premiums and actuarial values
were measured from different data sources, making comparisons between them impossible. The data here
are from the same survey, but are less exact.
'The 50 employee cutoff is common in the literature (Leibowitz and Chernew, 1992; Morrisey,
Jensen, and Morlock, 1993).
7The lower panel of Table I shows the distribution of premium changes.'2If there is
measurement error in the level of premiums, premium changes may be more informative about the degree
of experience rating. As with the level of premiums, the dispersion of premium changes is large. As
the first column shows, the overall difference between the 90th and 10th percentile premium change is
40 percent. There is an even greater differential (47 percent) for small firms. Interestingly, most of this
difference is due to the fact that many small firms experience premium reductions rather than because
of very large premium increases.
An important question about premium variability is whether these differences reflect reversion
of premiums to average levels, or whether they signal persistent Cost differences across firms. To the
extent that cost changes are merely transitory, the welfare implications of experience rating are small.
Using the reported benefit costs and the change in premiums, I formed an estimate of benefit costs in the
previous year. I then examine the persistence of benefit costs in consecutive years:
ln(B,)
= +(Q)ln(B,,); R2=.834; N=l,399 (3)
TheAR(1) coefficient is about .9, indicating that premiums are very highly correlated over time. Thus,
firms that realize an adverse shock will pay higher premiums for many years in the future.
11.1Accounting for Plan Generosity and Demographic DitTerences
If the variability in benefit costs were largely due to differences in the generosity of the insurance
plan or demographics of the group being insured, there would be little concern about this variation.
Premium variability would reflect choices made by firms, who were bearing the marginal cost of their
actions. The finding that premium changes are widely dispersed argues against this interpretation. While
°The premium changes are for a family policy. The survey did not ask for the change in individual
premiums. Some firms report a premium in 1991 but did not have an equivalent policy in the previous
year. The sample size for premium changes is therefore smaller than that for the level of premiums.
8the demographiccomposition of the workforce of the insurance policymay differ widely across firms at
apoint intime,the demographiccompositionvaries much less within a firm from one yeartothenext.
Toaddress this issue more formally, Ifirstformeda measure ofthe generosityofeach policy,
termedthe "actuarial value' of the plan. The actuarial value is an estimate of what the benefit costwould
be ifeveryonewho currently hasprivatehealthinsurancewereinsured under thatpolicy.Actuarial
values oftwo plans differ only because the benefits under one are more generous thanthebenefits under
the other. The appendix describes the formation of actuarialvalues.
Table 2 shows the distribution of actuarial values. The medianofthe actuarialvaluedistribution
is about 15 percent below that of the benefit cost distribution. If the actuarialvaluecalculation were
exact, these medianswouldbeapproximatelythesame. As the appendix discusses,however,the
actuarial valueislikely tobe understated because of missinginformationabout basic benefit coverage.
Asthe other rows indicate, the actuarial value distribution is muchless disperse thanthe benefit
cost distribution. The 90th percentile actuarial value exceeds the 10th percentile actuarial value by only
45 percent, and this is reasonably constant by firm size. Thus, at most one-quarter of thevariationin
benefit costscan beexplained by differences inthegenerosityofinsurance policies.
Infact, the share of benefit cost variation due to actuarialvaluedifferenceswillbe muchless
sincebenefit costs andactuarial values are notperfectly correlated. Table 3demonstratesthis in detail.
The Table shows howthe firms of a given actuarial valuequintile aredistributedamong quintiles of
benefit costs.If firms with lessgenerous policiessystematically had lower benefit costs, the percentages
along thediagonal would be high. In most cases,however,the percentages along the diagonal areabout
thesame as those offer the diagonal. Overall, the correlation between actuarial values and benefit costs
is only .13.
In addition to plan generosity, it is also important to account for demographic differences in
9explaining cost differentials.'3To examine this, Iestimatedaregression for the logarithm of benefit
costs, using the logarithm of actuarial value, the percentage of older workers (those over 50 years old),
and the percentage of the covered population that is retired and over age 65 as explanatory variables.
While other variables such as the gender and racial composition of the firm, and the share of early
retirees (below age 65) would also he useful predictors of benefit costs, these data are not available. I
restrict the sample to hservations where these variables and the turnover rate (used in Section V) are
reported. This selection eliminates 473 observations. This regression yields:'4





%OlderWk.r +(07)%Retirees; R2=.073; N=990
Firmswith more generous policies have higher benefit costs, although the elasticity is only .29.If
actuarial values were measured perfectly, the coefficient would be 1; measurement error likely explains
the difference.' Having a higher fraction of either older workers or retirees increases benefit costs.
These three factors only explain about 7 percent of the premium variability, however.
'3Premium differentials might also be due to different elasticities of demand by firms, leading insurers
to charge different oligopoly prices. I discount this explanation for two reasons. First, health insurance
is purchased on a regular basis, giving firms time to seek out the lowest price. Indeed, three-quarters
of all firms report receiving at least one insurance solicitation each 6 months (Morrisey, Jensen and
NIorlock, 1993). Second, if firms with high premiums were more profitable than firms with low
premiums, we would expect these firms to have the most secure insurance policies. In fact, however,
firms with high costs appear to have much more difficulty purchasing insurance than firms with low
costs.
'4Equation (4) and the econometric results in Section V are unweighted. The aggregate totals in Table
I, in contrast, are weighted using firm weights. Eliminating the weighting is for two reasons. First,
most of the factors involved in the weight—including firm size and industry—are included in the
regressions directly. Second, and more important, over 95 percent of all firms have 50 or fewer
employees. With such a small share of large firms, the models in Section V had difficulty converging
when the data were weighted. The principle difference between weighted and unweighted estimates is
the variance of premiums. The unweighted variance of log premiums is 11 percent, compared to 17
percent with the weighted data. None of the qualitative conclusions about variability by firm size are
affected by weighting, however.
'5Alternatively, itmaybe that healthier groups of workers systematically choose more generous
policies.
10Further, controlling for these factors does not eliminate the differential variance by firm size.
Theresidual variance is.122 for firms with 50 or fewer employees; .110 for firms with 51-100
employees;.081 forfirmswith101-500employees; .055 for firmswith 501-1000 employees; and .082
forfirms withover1000employees.
Thus,the premium data suggest two conclusions. First, the variability of premiums is large and
is not explained by differences in demographics or the generosity of benefits. Second, the differential
is greater for small firms than for large firms. Both of these facts suggest that the lack of intertemporal
pooling is an important economic issue, particularly for small firms. The next section discusses why this
pooling might not occur.
III.ExplanatIons for Experience Rating
At first pa.ss, economic theory suggests that experience rating should not be a major concern.
Individuals who are risk averse will be willing to pay more to alleviate the possibility that their premiums
will increase in the future. Profit maximizing insurers should be willing to supply this insurance. The
result would be markets for long-term insurance. Indeed, many forms of insurance (such as life
insurance) are in force until a person dies.
There are four potential reasons why markets for intertemporal insurance may not develop,
however.
Adverse Selection and Moral Hazard The first explanation is adverse selection or moral hazard. Insurers
may be afraid that offering long-term insurance will attract firms expecting costs to increase over time
(adverse selection) or that individuals who are guaranteed long-term insurance at an average price will
IItake less care of theirhealth(moralhazard).
Adverseselection is unlikely to be important in this market, however, because insurers have
nearly complete intormation. If the firm seeking insurance had insurance through the same company in
the previous year. the insurer knows spending directly. For new firms, insurers attempt to learn this
information through medical questionnaires or actual medical exarninations.6 Moreover, both adverse
selection and moral hazard problems can he avoided by appropriate contract design. In offering long-
term insurance, insurers do not have to specify fixed rates of premium increases. Rather, insurers could
merely guarantee to increase rates at the average cost for their entire pool. Thus, if costs increase
because of adverse selection or moral hazard, this would be compensated for by above average premium
increases. °
incompleteContracting A second explanation for experience rating is an inability of firms and insurers
to enforce to long-term contracts. As information about a firm's health costs are revealed, both firms
and insurers would want to renegotiate community rated policies. Firms that learn they have healthy
employees, for example, will want to leave community rated pools for lower cost policies. Insurers,
meanwhile, will want to drop firms with sick employees from the policy. If this recontracting is costless,
pools with different cost groups could never survive. The result would be full experience rating.'
This situation would not occur if commitments to multi-year contracts could be enforced.
Legally, however, it is widely perceived as difficult to force firms to comply with multi-year
'Fifty percent of all firms, and almost two-thirds of firms with fewer than 10 employees, report that
a medical questionnaire was required before they were able to purchase insurance.
°This also limits the exposure of insurers to cost increases arising from rapid technological change.
See Cutler (1992) for more discussion on this point.
'This difficulty arises in the discussion of optimal wage contracts as well (Harris and Holmstrom,
1982; Thomas and Worrall, 1988).
12commitments. Beyond legal enforcement, contracts can also discourage exit through prepayment of
premiums due in future years.'9 The cost of prepayment is likely to be substantial, however. As Table
I demonstrated.the variabilityof even annual premium changes is extremely large, let alone lifetime
premium variability. Hence, prepayment may not be an option for enforcing intertemporal health
insurance contracts.
LowDemand Athirdexplanationfor experience rating is that there is insufficient demand for community
rating on the part of firms seeking insurance. Imagine a situation where firms have a choice of
community rated or experience rated policies.20 For firms with below average expected costs, choosing
acommunityrated policy involves a current "payment" equal to the loss from not community rating.
In general, therefore, any factors that influence a firm's demand for insurance may also influence the
desire to enroll in a community rated policy instead of an experience rated policy.
I focus on three such factors. The first is the percentage of employees who have high wages (in
the data, this is measured as the percentage of employees earning above $35,000annually).Most
estimates of the income elasticity of insurance demand are greater than zero (Manning and Marquis,
1993), so that firms with more high-wage employees should demand more community rating than firms
with fewer high-wage employees. The second factor is the percentage of older employees (measured as
the percentage of employees over 50 yearsofage). Empirically, the variance of health expenditures rises
L9AS Pauly, Kunreuther, and Hirth (1992) and Cochrane (1992) demonstrate, prepayment can
effectively be thought of as a two-part premium —onepremium to cover the cost of care in any given
year, and one premium to compensate firms that learn they will have higher costs in future years.
9he discussion of the choice between community rated and experience rated policies is a
simplification of market conditions.Anecdotally, some insurers (generally small insurers) will
aggressively experience rate their clients, while other insurers (generally large insurers) engage in much
less experience rating.
13with age. With a greater variability of costs, older employees may prefermore community rated
policies.The third variable is the firm's turnover rate. In firms with high turnover, employees will
perceive less benefit to a long-term insurance commitment, because their probability of being at that firm
in future years is low. Thus, employees in high turnover firms may thus not he willing to pay as much
for a community rated pollcy.r The fourth panel of Table 4 reports means for these variables. The
average firm had 20 percent of its employees earning over $35,000 annually, 17 percent of its employes
over 50 years ot age, and had a turnover rate of 13 percent.
PublicSector Subsidies to the Uninsured Afinal explanation for the prevalence of experience rating is
that public policy may induce firms to choose experience rated policies. In many ways, public policy
subsidizes care for the uninsured. Many poor individuals can qualify for Medicaid if they do not have
private health insurance. In states with more generous Medicaid policies, therefore, firms may decide
to choose experience rated policies and risk becoming uninsured. I measure the generosity of Medicaid
as the income level a pregnant woman can have and still obtain Medicaid coverage. Other people may
receive uncompensated medical care if they are uninsured, with the costs passed on to the insured in the
form of higher costs. Since much of this care is provided in public hospitals, I proxy for this with the
share of the hospital beds in the state that are in public hospitals. Finally, many states (2! in 1991) have
subsidized pools for firms that want to purchase insurance but cannot obtain it privately (high risk
pools"). Firms in these states may decide that the pool is an adequate insurer of last resort, and thus
21This will be additionally true if some of the predictable differences due to demographics are pooled
as well.
I ignore any endogeneity of the turnover rate to decisions about whether to enroll in community
rated policies.
l count states as having a high risk pool if they had such a pool, or a state-facilitated small-employer
pool, in place before 1990. More recent mechanisms may not have had time to influence firm behavior.
14enroll in experience rated policies until their premiums become unacceptably high. The last panel of
Table 4 presents the means for the public policy measures. On average, 16 percent of hospital beds are
in public hospitals, women can qualify for Medicaid with income up to 167 percent of poverty, and 43
percent of firms are in states with a high risk pooi.
In the remainder of the paper, I examine whether there is any evidence that firm-based demand
factors or public policy factors influence the variability of premiums, particularly for small firms.
Unfortunately, there are no data to measure the importance of adverse selection, moral hazard, or contract
enforcement. The analysis thus cannot fully partition the sources of experience rating. It may, however,
indicate which directions are most important to pursue.
IV.Econometric Framework
A first test of these alternative explanations for experience rating is to relate the variance of
benefit costs to measures of demand or public policy. Since the decision to purchase community rated
policies is most important for small firms, I begin with that group.2' I first classify firms as high-wage
or low-wage, depending on whether the share of employees earning over $35,000isabove or below the
mean. The demand explanation suggests that small firms with above average levels of high-wage
employees should have less variable premiums than small firms with below average levels of high-wage
employees.
The first column of Table 5showsthis comparison. The variance of benefit costs for low-wage
small firms is .143. compared to .134 for high-wage small firms. Consistent with the theory, the
'As before, small firms are defined as having 50orfewer employees.
15variance is lower (by -.009) for high-wage small firms.
Thereareseveral reasons that premiums variances may differ across firms, however, unrelated
to the choice of community or experience rating. Firms with high wages, for example, might have less
variablebenefitspackages or less diverse risks than the average firm. To the extent that these differences
are not captured through other variables in the equation, the comparison in the first set of columns will
be biased. The natural solution is to use a control group where the experience rating decision is less
important. I high-wage firms have lower variance even among firms where experience rating is less
important, it would suggest that the differences noted in the first column are due to other factors beyond
the experience rating choice. Since large firms (over 50 employees) are already well diversified
internally, they provide a natural control group.
The second columns of Table 5showthe variance difference for high-wage and low-wage large
firms. Among large firms, those with above average shares of high-wage employees morevariable
premiums than those with below average shares of high-wage employees, by .009.The"difference-in-
difference estimate of the extent of premium variability, presented in the last column, is therefore that
high-wage small firms choose premiums which are -.018 percent lower than low-wage small firms.
Unfortunately, the standard error around this coefficient is large, making precise inference difficult.
The remaining rows of Table 5 show similar comparisons for the other demand and public policy
factors. There is little difference in premium variability for older firms relative to younger firms. Firms
with high turnover have greater variability than firms with lower turnover, and this result is statistically
significant. There is thus preliminary evidence that wages and turnover may explain the amount of
experience rating. The results for the public policy factors are more mixed. In states with more liberal
Medicaid eligibility, premiums are more variable than in states with less liberal eligibility, consistent with
the theory. Premiums are less variable in states with risk pools, however, compared to states without
risk pools.In both cases, however, the standard errors are sufficiently large to rule out strong
16conclusions.
The most obvousomission from Table 5 are other control variablesforbenefit costs and residual
variances.Toincorporatethesevariables, I considerthefollowing set of equations:
ln(B) =Z9 X2 + D, + D.SmallFirm +
(5)
ln(a)=Zy+Xy2 + Dy, + D.SmallFirmy4.
where ZandXarethe policy andfirmcharacteristics, and D is the set of factors influencing demand for
community rating. In this equation, y measures the effect of demandorpublic policy factors on
premium variability in large firms, whilemeasures the differential effect in small firms relative to that
in large firms. The null hypothesis is that
With an assumed distribution function for premiums (e.g., a normal)27, equations (5)canbe
estimated simultaneously. The likelihood function is:
L=fl exp--!-. (6)
f(2,ra) 2o
Thereare two potential selection issues complicating estimation of equation (6). First, as noted
above, data are not available for all self-insured firms. I thus restrict the sample to firms of 1000 or
'ln principle, the D variables could be excluded from the benefit cost equation. In practice,
however, including these variables eliminates the possibility that differences in average premiums
associated with these variables will be reflected in differences in variability.
2The variance equation is specified in logarithms to constrain the estimates from becoming negative.
Economic theory does not predict a simple distribution for small firm premiums. Health
expenditures are generally distributed lognormally. Covered services are a non-linear function of health
expenditures, however, and observed premiums are the average of this non-linear function. I assume a
normal distribution for simplicity and because it should be accurate for large firms, where the central
limit theorem is applicable.
17fewer employees.Second, not all firms choose to offer insurance. Omitting firms that do not offer
insurance is likely to bias the estimates againstfindingany effects of community rating decisions, If
firms that choose experience rating are also less likely to offer insurance, as seems likely, the observed
premium variance for these firms will underestimate the true variance in the population. I have tried to
model the decision to offer insurance along with the equation for benefit costs, but found the likelihood
function poorly hehaved. I thus omit firms that do not offer insurance, with the knowledge that any
effects I find are an underestimate of the true effect.
Vi.EstimationResults
Estimatingequation (6) requires specification of the policy characteristics (Z), the firm-specific
variables (X), and the factors influencing experience rating (D). To measure the policy characteristics,
I use the logarithm of the plan's actuarial value and the number of years the firm has been with that
insurer. Typically, premiums increase over time as pre-existing conditions exclusions are exhausted.3°
l have experimented with different cutoffs, including 500employees,with very similar results. I
have also estimated the model with an additional equation for the probability that a firm has a premium
equivalent. The results were again similar to those reported.
l assumed that each firm has a "reservation premium" ln(R)=X5+E, below which it will offer







whereo', is the conditional variance of given €.Inpractice, it proved difficult to estimate ,a,and
3°T'his is also termed "durational rating".
18Thus, benefit costs should rise with the number of years with the insurer.31 1 truncate the years covered
at 3 years, since pre-existing conditions exclusions rarely last longer than that period.
I include several firm-specific controls. The first two are the logarithm of total employment and
its square. Controlling for employment is important because in the absence of pooling, premium
variability should decline with firm size. The squared term is included to capture any non-linear effecs
of firm size.I also include the percent of covered people who are retirees to control for demographic
differences across firms. Finally, I include 10 industry dummies to capture persistent cost differences
across industries. The upper panels of Table 4 present the means for the control variables.
The firm and public policy variables potentially influencing experience rating decisions were
discussed above. Because the public policy variables are defined at the state level, some care must be
taken for firms with employees in multiple states. The HLAA survey asks whether the firm had
employees at "other company branches or locations in the United States". For firms with multiple
branches, I include the firm only if at least 75 percent of employment was at the surveyed location. This
limits the sample of firms for the equations with public policy measures to 581 observations.
Table 6 presents the first set of results on the determinants of premium variability. The models
in Table 6 include only the firm-specific factors; the public policy variables are omitted. The first three
equations include the three demand measures separately; the last equation includes all three measures
together. The coefficients in the benefit cost equation are similar across specifications and generally in
line with predictions. Firms with more generous benefit packages have higher premiums, although the
elasticity is again below 1.0. Firms that have been with their insurer for a longer period of time have
higher premiums than firms that have been with their insurer for a shorter period. The coefficient
suggests that premiums rise about 2 to 3 percent per year in the first three years. There is little change
The years with insurer might legitimately be excluded because it is a choice variable for the firm.
Omitting the years with insurer has very little effect on the other coefficients.
19in benefit costs for firms of different sizes. Premiums are higher for firms that cover more retirees, firms
that have higher-wage employees, and firms that have olr workers.
Theequationfor the residual variance shows large differences in variance by firm size. Residual
variances decline with employment for most of the range examined. Firms with more retirees also have
smaller residual variances. Neither the generosity of benefits nor the years with insurer have any affect
on the residual variance.
Most importantly, there is significant evidence that firm-specific factors — particularly high wages
and low turnover -- affect the degree of premium variability. As the first equation shows, the residual
variance declines with high-wage employees in small firms compared to its value in large firms (the
coefficient on %HighWage*SnlaII Firm isnegative). The implication is that high-wage firms choose less
variable insurance policies than their low-wage counterparts. The second equation uses the percent of
older workers to proxy for demand. In this equation, there is no difference in premium variability for
firms with older and younger workers. The third equation uses turnover to measure demand. This
equation shows significant effects on premium variability.Small firms with low turnover have
significantly smaller residual variances than small firms with high turnover.
When the demand measures are included jointly, the coefficient on %HighWage sSmallFirm
increases in magnitude and remains statistically significant. The coefficient on %Turnover*SmallFinn
fails in magnitude and is not statistically significant. Thus, the most important predictor of premium
variability (in this specification) is the percentage of high-wage employees, and there is mixed evidence
on the importance of firm turnover.
These findings appear to be robust to a variety of alternative specifications. The most important
concern is that the equations do not fully capture the effects of firm size, and thus factors correlated with
firm size might influence the results.I have addressed this concern in several ways. First, I have
included higher order terms in the logarithm of employment, with very similar results. Second, I have
20used dummy variablesfor firms ofdifferent sizes," again with similar results.
To evaluate the magnitude of these coefficients, I find the predicted variance for firms with the
average set of characteristics, and then vary the factors affecting experience rating by one standard
deviation. The difference between these two predicted variances is a measure of the effect of demand
factors on premium variability.
The resultsareas follows:
Effects of Demand Factors on Residual Variance
Baseline Variance .083%
Effect of One Standard Deviation Increase in:
%High Wage employees -.017%(-20.4%)
%Older employees -.006%(-7.2%)
%Turnover .013%(15.7%)
The first row of the table shows that the variance of the residual for the typical firm is 8.3
percent. Increasing the percentage of high-wage employees by one standard deviation would lower the
variance by 1.7 percentage points, or 20 percent. Increasing the share of older workers would lower the
variance by only 7 percent, while increasing the turnover rate would raise the variance by 16 percent.
The effects of high wages and turnover are thus relatively large.
Having found evidence of firm-specific effects on premium variability, I next expand the analysis
to test the public policy explanation. Table 7 presents the results of these tests. The first equation in
Table 7 repeats the specification from the fourth column of Table 6, to examine the effect of the smaller
"1 included dummy variables for firms of 1-4 employees; 5-9 employees; 10-19 employees; 20-49
employees; 50-99 employees; and 100+ employees. These categories correspond to reported gradations
in administrative loads.
21sample size on the firm variables. Generally, the results are similar to those in Table 6. Indeed, as the
last panel shows, there are even larger experience rating effects with this sample. Both higher wage firms
and firms with lower turnover have significantly lower premium variability than their counterpart firms.
There is again no evidence that firms with older employees have different variability than firms with
younger employees.
The second equation includes the public policy measures by themselves, without the firm
measures. The third equation includes the two together. In both the second and third equations, there
is no evidence that public policy variables affect the degree of experience rating. In states with higher
Medicaid income cutoffs the residual variance among largefirmsis greater (the coefficient on Medicaid
Income Cutoff ispositive and statistically significant). The variance is not differentially larger for small
firms compared to large firms, however. Beyond this variable, none of the other public policy measures
affects the amount of experience rating.
As the third equation shows, the firm-specific factors still predict the degree of experience rating,
even when the public policy measures are included. The one qualitative difference is the effect of hig.
wage employees on variability. When the public policy variables are included, the coefficient on %High
WageSmall Firm fallsin magnitude and is statistically insignificant.33 Because the public policy
variables are generally not statistically significant in themselves, however, I focus on the specifications
without the public policy measures.
I have explored the sensitivity of the public policy coefficients to a number of alternative
definitions, with similar results. Including teaching hospital beds in the measure of public sector beds,
for example, has no effect on the results. The same is true if public hospital beds per capita is used to
measure public sector generosity. I have also measured Medicaid generosity as the percentage of women
in the state who would qualify for Medicaid given their income and family status. This too had no effects
33This finding is largely due to the inclusion of public hospital beds and the Medicaid income cutoff.
22on the results.
One potential explanation for the lack of effects of the public policy variables is that the response
is not uniform across firms. In particular, firms with lower wage employees may be more responsive
to public policy factors, since employees in these firms are more likely to qualify for public assistance
if they become uninsured. To examine this hypothesis, I re-estimated equation (6) including interaction
terms of the form %Public*SmallFirm*1_ow_ Wage Firm, and the same for the Medicaid and Risk Pool
variables?4 If public policy variables have an effect on low-wage small firms, the coefficient on the
low-wage interaction terms will he positive and statistically significant. In fact, however, there were no
significant differences between low-wage small firms and high-wage small firms. In all three cases, the
coefficients on these additional interactions were small in magnitude and statistically insignificant.
The conclusion from Tables 6 and 7 is thus that firm-specific factors influence the demand for
community rating, hut public policy variables do not. The most important firm variables are the
percentage of high-wage employees and the turnover rate. Firms with more higher wage employees have
less variable premiums than would otherwise be expected, as do firms with lower turnover. While these
results are not statistically significant in every equation, the estimates are reasonably consistent f'
different samples and for different sets of other controls.
VI.Conclusion
The variability of health insurance premiums is large, and is not due to differences in the
generosity of benefits or the characteristics of the group being insured, The variability is related to the
percentage of high-wage employees in the firm and the firm's turnover rate, however. This is consistent
'I consider firms low-wage if fewer than 10 percent of employees earn above $35,000 annually.
Roughly one-third of the firms meet this criterion.
23with a model where firms have choices overimplicit insurance duration and where the demand for
community rating varies across firms.
As a policy matter, one is tempted to conclude that if the demand for community rating among
some firms is low, these firms should not be compelled to purchase this insurance. This conclusion is
less obvious than it seems, however. The fact that employees do not value this insurance on any
particular jobdoes not mean that they do not value it in general. Consider the example of firms with
high turnover. Because employees are not at one particular firm for many years, they have little interest
in the long-term insurance decisions of that firm. The fact that they will be employed at some firm,
however, means that they have an interest in the aggregate decisions of firms at which they might be
employed. The lack of coordination across firms would then lead to a welfare loss, and mandating
community rating could improve welfare. Whether community rating is more of a distortionary mandate
or a solution to coordination problems is an important subject for future research.
24Appendix: Forming Actuarial Values
To compare the generosity of different insurance policies, I form a measure of the actuarial value
of the policy --theexpected benefit cost if everyone in the population were insured under that policy.
To form the actuarial value, I proceed in four steps. First, I find the set of covered services. All
packages are assumed to cover hospital care, physician care, vision care, and durable equipment. Some
also cover prescription drugs and mental health (asked about on the survey). I also determined if the
deductible covered hospital care and prescription drugs. Second, I use the "major medical" provisions
in the plan (the deductible, coinsurance rate, and out-of-pocket maximum) to determine what total
spending under the plan would be relative to a "typical plan": a policy with a $200 individual deductible
and 20% coinsurance rate. The utilization elasticities were those in the Rand Health Insurance
Experiment (Newhouse, 1994). Separate elasticities were applied for acute and mental health care.
Third, the utilization index was applied to a random group of the population to determine what total
spending under the plan would be. The sample used was the 1987 National Medical Expenditure Survey
sample, where baseline spending was inflated to 1991 dollars.Finally, I used the major medical
provisions to divide spending into covered services and out-of-pocket expenses. The actuarial value is
the average covered service amount.
To make the methodology concrete, consider two specific plans. The first plan as a $200
deductible and 20% coinsurance up to a $1,500 out-of-pocket limit. The second plan has no deductible
or coinsurance. Based on the Rand Health Insurance, spending under the second plan will be 60 percent
greater than spending under the first plan. Now suppose that there are two individuals. One spends
$1,000 in the baseline, and the other spends $10,000. The table shows how actuarial values would be
calculated.
Spending Covered Out-of
Individual Baseline Reform Services Pocket
Plan I I $1,000 $1,000 $640 $360
2 $10,000 $10,000 $8,500 $1,500
Actuariai Value $4,570
Plan 2 1 $1,000 $1,600 $1,600 $0
2 $10,000 $16,000 $16,000 $0
Actuarial Value $8,800
The most important omission from the actuarial value calculation is that some plans have first
dollar coverage for hospital care, termed "basic coverage, before the major medical coverage is
triggered. A typical basic plan will cover the first 30 or 60 days of hospital care with no cost sharing.
Unfortunately, information about basic coverage is not available in the data. The missing basic coverage
information may explain why the mean of the actuarial value distribution is below the mean of the benefit
cost distribution.
Actuarial values cannot reasonably be formed for Health Maintenance Organizations and Point-of-
Service plans, since more of the differences are the degree of management rather than the benefits. Thus,
I use conventional policies and PPOs only (with an assumed 5 percent management discount). This is
not a major problem since most firms --particularlymost small firms —offera conventional policy.References
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Firm Size
Percentile Total ￿50 51-100 101-500501-1000>1000
Benefit Cost
10 $831 $782 $925 $833 $1,017 $1,069
50 1,366 1,385 1,353 1,227 1,343 1,422
90 2,126 2,143 2,034 1,753 1,734 2,143
90/10 156% 174% 120% 111% 71% 100%
.169 .183 .119 .106 .047 .098
N 1,463 383 155 441 114 370
Changein Benefit Cost
10 -11% -19% 0% 0% 0% 0%
50 14 14 17 13 13 12
90 26 26 26 26 23 22
90-10 37% 45% 26% 26% 23% 22%
362% 413% 174% 184% 227% 86%
N 1,399 349 154 428 112 356
The table shows the distribution of benefit costs and changes in benefit costsforindividual
policies. Costs are weighted to reflect firm totals.Table 2:Distribution of Actuarial Value
Percentile Total
Firm Size




$1,041 $1,041$1,030 $1,045 $1,112 $1,001
50 1,180 1,180 1,176 1,201 1,220 1,183
90 1,515 1,521 1,341 1,465 1,441 1,409
90/10 45% 46% 30% 40% 30% 41%
2 .025 .026 .019 .024 .021 .022
N 1,463 383 155 441 114 370
The table shows the distribution of actuarial values for an individual policies. Values are weighted




1 2 3 4 5 Total
I 14% 21% 22% 25% 19% 100%
2 18% 29% 24% 21% 8% 100%
3 27% 16% 18% 12% 27% F00%
4 16% 21% 13% 18% 32% 100%
5 25% 5% 18% 34% 18% 100%
The table shows the percentage of firms in each row (the quintile of actuarial value) that are
in each column (the quintile of benefit cost).Table 4: Summary Statistics
Standard
Variable Number Mean Deviation
Dependen Variable
log(Benefit Cost) 817 7.2 0.4
PolicyCharacteristics
Iog(Actuarial Value) 817 7.1 0.2
Years with Insurer 817 2.4 0.9
Firm Controls
log(Employment) 817 2.6 1.4
%Retirees 817 2.7% 14.5%
Experience Rating: Firm Demand
%I-Iigh Wage 817 20.2% 23.3%
%Older Workers 817 17.4% 19.5%




The table shows summary statistics for the firm and policy variables.
Experience Rating: Public Policy
%Public Hospitals
Medicaid Coverage
Risk PoolP
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